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Collin: Refusals To Deal

REFUSALS TO DEAL BY MONOPOLISTS
RECENT DECISIONS
THOMAS J. COLLIN*

A

refusal to deal is lawful under the Sherman Act' unless, as

UNILATERAL

the Supreme Court noted more than sixty years ago in United States

v. Colgate & Company (Colgate),' the firm refusing to deal has a "purpose

to create or maintain a monopoly."' If this purpose is absent, a firm acting
on its own can refuse to deal "for any reason or for no reason at all."' Not
surprisingly, plaintiffs have repeatedly sought to avail themselves of this
"monopoly" exception to the Colgate doctrine by challenging refusals
to
deal under section 2 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits monopolization.'
Recent judicial and administrative attention to monopolists' refusals
to deal has produced tests of legality inconsistent with conventional section
2 standards. Section 2 is the only provision of the Sherman Act under which
single-firm conduct can be challenged. Some courts, ignoring section 2
standards, have attempted to evaluate this conduct under section 1 of the
Sherman Act.' Other courts have required proof of specific intent to monopolize even though proof of unlawful monopolization requires only evidence of general intent. The Federal Trade Commission has even attempted
to impose liability on a monopolist in the absence of fault.
This article will review and evaluate these recent principal cases,
both judicial and administrative, in which single-firm refusals to deal by
monopolists have been challenged under section 2 of the Sherman Act or,
by analogy, under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. It will
demonstrate that there is no reason to depart from conventional monopolization analysis in deciding these cases.
I.

INTRODUCTION:

THE

COLGATE

DOCTRINE

In Colgate the Supreme Court reviewed the sufficiency of an indictment
*Member Ohio Bar and Associate with Thompson, H-ine & Flory-Cleveland, Ohio.

1 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-8 (1976).
2 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
'Id. at 307.
4 Lamb's Patio Theatre, Inc. v. Universal Film Exchanges, Inc., 582 F.2d 1068, 1070 (7th

Cir. 1978).

5Section 2 of the Sherman Act provides in pertinent
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to
with any other person or persons, to monopolize
among the several States, or with foreign nations,
15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).

part as follows:
monopolize, or combine or conspire
any part of the trade or commerce
shall be deemed guilty of a felony.

6 Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides in pertinent part as follows:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
declared to be illegal.

15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
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charging Colgate & Company with entering into a combination with its
wholesalers and retailers to fix the resale prices of its soap and toilet products.' The trial court sustained a demurrer to the indictment on the ground
that it recited only a unilateral refusal on the part of Colgate to sell to
8
customers "who would not resell at indicated prices." In affirming the
lower court's action, the Supreme Court noted:
the indictment does not charge Colgate & Company with selling its
products to dealers under agreements which obligated the latter not
to resell except at prices fixed by the company.'
The Court reasoned that under these circumstances no violation of the
Sherman Act had been charged:
In the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly, the
act does not restrict the long recognized right of trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his
own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal."
This proposition continues to be honored, 1 and the courts find no
difficulty in approving unilateral refusals to deal in the absence of a purpose to create or maintain a monopoly. When, however, the firm refusing
to deal possesses monopoly power, the refusal, even though unilateral and
therefore not subject to challenge under section 1 of the Sherman Act,
is nonetheless subject to review under section 2.
As will be seen below, the courts and the Federal Trade Commission
have repeatedly failed to apply proper section 2 standards and have instead fashioned unwarranted ad hoc tests of legality when evaluating the
legality of unilateral refusals to deal by firms possessing monopoly power.
II. REFUSALS TO DEAL BY SINGLE-FIRM MONOPOLISTS
Single-firm refusals subject to evaluation under the monopolization
branch of section 2 fall into two general categories: refusals to deal with
competitors and refusals to deal with non-competitors. Decisions under
these two headings are reviewed below.
Refusals to Deal With Competitors
Refusals by single firms to deal directly with competitors have given
rise to potential section 2 liability only (1) in the case of vertically integrated monopolists and (2) when a monopolist refuses to make an essential
facility or service available.

A.

T250 U.S. at 302-04.
8253 F. 522, 527 (E.D. Va. 1918).
9 250 U.S. at 307.
10 Id.

"1 See, e4., Official Airline Guides, Inc. v. FTC, 1980-2 Trade Cas.

63,544 at 76,920 (2d

Cir. 1980, cert. denied, - U.S. -, Byars v. Bluff City News Co., 609 F.2d 843, 854 (6th Cir.
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol14/iss4/1
1979).
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1. Refusal to Deal by a Vertically Integrated Monopolist
A vertically integrated monopolist is a firm which has monopoly
power at one level of the production or distribution of a product or service
and is at the same time engaged at another level in the production or distribution of the product or service. 12 Section 2 liability for a refusal to
deal by a vertically integrated monopolist has typically been predicated
upon the refusal by a firm with a lawful monopoly in one market, such as
a manufacturing market, to sell to customers competing with its own distribution organization." The Supreme Court faced this situation in Otter
Tail Power Co. v. United States (Otter Tail)." The Court held that an
electric utility violated section 2 when it used its monopoly power in the
market for the transmission of electric power to foreclose potential entrants
at the resale level from obtaining electric power from other sources.1 5
The major cases in this class of refusals before and including Otter Tail
were exhaustively reviewed in a 1974 student note," and there is no need
to discuss them further here.' A recent decision by the Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit raises serious questions about the proper section 2
analysis for this type of conduct, however, and it warrants extended consideration.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the duty of a
monopolist to deal in Byars v. Bluff City News Co. (Byars) s The plaintiff,
Byars, distributed periodicals to retail outlets in certain sections of the
Memphis metropolitan area." The defendant, Bluff City News Company
(Bluff City), was the sole supplier of periodicals for resale in the Memphis
area.2" It both supplied Byars and distributed periodicals to all remaining
retail outlets in the Memphis area.
Bluff City had been Byars' sole source of supply for what are known
12See generally 3 P. ARiEDA AND D. TURNER, ANqrrrausT LAw
723-25 (1978) [hereinafter cited as AREEDA & TURNER].
13
See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359 (1927);
Six Twenty-Nine Prods., Inc. v. Rollins Telecasting, Inc., 365 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1966).
14410 U.S. 366 (1973).
15 Id. at 377.
1eNote, Refusals to Deal by

Vertically Integrated Monopolists, 87 HARv. L. REV. 1720

(1974) [hereinafter cited as Note, Refusals to Deal].
17The Note reviewed the following decisions: Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410
U.S. 366 (1973); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359
(1927), Poster Exchange, Inc. v. National Screen Serv. Corp., 431 F.2d 334 (5th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 912 (1971); Six Twenty-Nine Prods., Inc. v. Rollins Telecasting, Inc., 365 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1966); Packaged Programs, Inc. v. Westinghouse
Broadcasting Co., 255 F.2d 708 (3d Cir. 1958); United States v. Klearflax Linen Looms,
Inc., 63 F. Supp. 32 (D. Minn. 1945).
18609 F.2d 843 (6th Cir. 1979).
29 Id. at 847.
20 Id.at 852.
Published
1981
3
21 Id. by
at IdeaExchange@UAkron,
847.
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as primary line periodicals, i.e., those periodical publications with the broadest popular appear,22 but it stopped selling them to Byars at the end of
1970.22 Following Bluff City's refusal to deal, Byars brought an action
under section 2. Byars urged that Bluff City, as a monopolist, had a duty
to deal with him and that its refusal to deal violated section 2.24 The district court, after a bench trial, rejected Byars' arguments and entered judgment for defendant. 5 The court of appeals reversed.
The court of appeals began its analysis of whether or not Bluff City
had a duty to deal by identifying the elements of proof necessary to show
unlawful monopolization:
1) possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and 2) "the
willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from
growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident."2 "
The court disagreed with the district court's conclusion that Bluff City did
not possess monopoly power in the relevant market, the market for primary
line periodicals for resale,2 and concluded that additional fact-finding was
necessary before a determination about the existence of monopoly power
could be made. 8
The court of appeals then turned its attention to whether or not, assuming the district court on remand were to conclude that in fact Bluff
City possessed monopoly power in the relevant market, Bluff City had used
that power unlawfully.2 9 Byars contended that Bluff City abused its monopoly power by refusing to deal with him."
Before embarking on a lengthy discussion of abuse of monopoly power, the court of appeals noted that Byars and Bluff City were not competitors prior to the refusal to deal, but thereafter they directly competed
for the small retail accounts which Byars had previously serviced on his
own. 21 Thus, Byars and Bluff City were potential competitors as long as
Bluff City continued to deal with Byars, but after the refusal they became
actual competitors.
2

2 Id. at 848-49. Although Byars was eventually able to acquire primary line periodicals from
other sources, his access to these other sources was limited and, as the court noted, he had
therefore "been unable to fully compete with the defendant since he cannot expand the
number of stores which he services." Id.
23 Id. at 848.
24 Id. at 846.

25 Id.
26 Id. at 849, quoting United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966).

609 F.2d at 852.
at 852-53.
2 Id.at 853.
3old. Byars also contended that Bluff City had abused its monopoly power by engaging in
27

28Id.

certain "dirty tricks." [d.

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol14/iss4/1
1
1Id.at 853-54.
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Before recommending a framework for analysis of refusals to deal by
monopolists, the court analyzed existing law. It first observed, citing representative cases, that if Bluff City were found on remand not to possess
monopoly power, "it could have terminated, with impunity, its relationship
with Byars."" The court then noted that there are two general circumstances under which a duty to deal has been imposed upon a monopolist.
Citing and discussing Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co.
(Eastman Kodak)," Lorain Journal Co. v. United States (Lorain Journal),"
Otter Tail 5 and lower court decisions," the court pointed out that a refusal can violate section 2 if it is "done with intent to preserve a monopoly."3
It referred to this as the "intent" theory of liability."'
The court then identified a second circumstance under which the
courts have held that a monopolist's refusal to deal violates section 2. The
refusal violates section 2 if it denies competitors "reasonable access" to a
scarce facility."9 The court referred to this as the "bottleneck" theory of
liability."0 It cited as authority for this theory United States v. Terminal
Railroad Association (Terminal Railroad)," Associated Press v. United
States (Associated Press)"2 and comparable lower court cases, some of them
arising from concerted refusals to deal.' It then observed that the Supreme
Court had merged both the bottleneck and intent theories to find liability in
Otter Tail."
After identification of these two general theories for imposing a duty
to deal, the court listed, by reviewing applicable cases, the different factual
321d. at 855. The court relied upon Section 1 (15 U.S.C. § 1) cases such as Joseph E.
Seagram & Sons v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd., 416 F.2d 71 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 1062 (1969); Ace Beer Distribs., Inc. v. Kohn, Inc., 318 F.2d 283 (6th Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 922 (1964); and Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co.,
243 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 822 (1957), in support of this conclusion.
33273 U.S. 359 (1927).
- 342 U.S. 143 (1951).
35 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
BePoster Exchange, Inc. v. National Screen Service Corp., 431 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 912 (1971); United States v. Klearflax Linen Looms, Inc., 63 F.
Supp. 32 (D. Minn. 1945).
3 609 F.2d at 856.
38 ld.

80 Id.
,0 Id.
41224 U.S. 383 (1912).
4326 U.S. 1 (1945).
43 609 F.2d at 856 n. 34. The court cited Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum
Co. of America, 438 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972);
Six Twenty-Nine Prods., Inc. v. Rollins Telecasting, Inc., 365 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1966);
Packaged Programs, Inc. v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 255 F.2d 708 (3d Cir. 1958);
and Gamco, Inc. v. Providence Fruit & Produce Bldg., Inc., 194 F.2d 484 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 344 U.S. 817 (1952).
4 609byF.2d
at 857.
Published
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contexts in which the duty of a monopolist to deal had been addressed.'
It identified four separate factual contexts:
1. A refusal to deal which has as its purpose the impairment of
competition in a market other than that in which the defendant
has monopoly power;
2. A refusal to deal with customers of a competitor;'
3. A refusal to deal which bars competitors access to "an indispen8
sable facility which cannot be easily duplicated;"
49
4. A refusal to deal in furtherance of vertical integration.
The court observed that Bluff City's conduct placed it in the fourth category,
and it noted that if the district court on remand were to determine that
Bluff City were in fact a monopolist, then "application of Otter Tail, Kodak
0
and Poster Exchange would seemingly result in a quick finding of liability.""
Things are not always what they seem, however, and the court declined to impose an absolute duty to deal on a monopolist "in the vertical
integration context."'" Instead, it turned its attention to identification of
those criteria which, in its view, should be taken into account in determining
whether a refusal to deal in this setting violates section 2.
At the outset of its discussion of these criteria, the court noted that
the cases addressing a monopolist's duty to deal "have effectively required
a finding of specific intent to monopolize."'" Without addressing the pro53
priety of the use of a specific intent standard, the court emphasized that
intent was, in any event, not dispositive:
5 Id.

"The

court cited as representative cases: Six Twenty-Nine Prods., Inc. v. Rollins Tele-

casting, Inc., 365 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1966); and Packaged Programs, Inc. v. Westinghouse
Broadcasting Co., 255 F.2d 708 (3d Cir. 1958). Id. at 857.

4' The court cited as representative cases: Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S.

143 (1951); North Texas Producers Ass'n v. Metzger Dairies, Inc., 348 F.2d 189 (5th
Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 977 (1966); and Kansas City Star Co. v. United States,
240 F.2d 643 (8th Cir), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 923 (1957). Id. at 858.
48The

court cited as representative cases: United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S.

49The

court cited as representative cases: Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials

383 (1912); and Gamco, Inc. v. Providence Fruit & Produce Bldg., Inc., 194 F.2d 484 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 817 (1952). Id. at 858.
Co., 273 U.S. 359 (1927); Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973);
and Poster Exchange, Inc. v. National Screen Service Corp., 431 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 912 (1971). Id. at 858.

oId. at 859.

51Id.
52ld.

(emphasis in original).

58 The Supreme Court expressly rejected the need to prove specific intent in a monopolization case in United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948). Proof of specific, as opposed
to general, intent "is necessary only where the acts fall short of the results condemned
by the Act," i.e., only in an attempt case under Section 2. 334 U.S. at 105. See generally

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol14/iss4/1
notes 179-91 infra and accompanying text.
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[W]hat should matter is not the monopolist's state of mind, but the
overall impact of the monopolist's practices. As preservation of competition is at the heart of the Sherman and Clayton Acts, a practice
should be deemed "unfair" or "predatory" only if it is unreasonably
anti-competitive. In a § 2 case, only a thorough analysis of each fact
situation will reveal whether the monopolist's conduct is unreasonably
anti-competitive and thus unlawful."
After observing that the "anti-competitive impact" of the first three
types of refusal listed above is "obvious,""5 the court proceeded to explain
how the impact in the case of a vertically integrating monopolist is, in contrast, anything but "obvious." 56 It then set out to detail the variables which
must be weighed to determine whether a refusal to deal in this latter factual
context is, in its words, "unreasonably anti-competitive" and therefore
unlawful.
The court first noted that vertical integration is normally undertaken
to achieve marketing and distribution efficiencies and that "[s]ubstitution
of a more efficient distributor (the monopolist) for a less-efficient one via
a refusal to deal would ordinarily enhance competition in the distribution
market."5 ' The court acknowledged, however, that a refusal to deal in furtherance of vertical integration may, under some circumstances, prove anticompetitive, 8 but it reasoned that a refusal producing marketing efficiencies
would be justifiable5 0 It directed the district court to "analyze the evidence
and make a determination whether Bluff City's cut-off of Byars was justifiable on efficiency grounds.""
The court also ruled that the district court should examine the business
reasons which might have justified Bluff City's refusal to deal."' Bluff
City contended that by refusing to deal with Byars, it had put itself in a
position better to control its publications distribution and better to handle
returns of unsold periodicals.' The court stated that if in fact this were
the case, then its conduct could be justified." Although the court did not
expressly say so, the implication here is that even if the refusal produced
no efficiencies but was carried out in furtherance of legitimate business
"609 F.2d at 860 (footnote omitted).
53 Id.
" Id.at 861-62.
67 Id.at 861.
58 Id.at 861-62. It would be anticompetitive, according to the court, if it facilitated price
discrimination, heightened entry barriers or facilitated evasion of regulation of monopoly
profits. Id. at 861.
591d. at 861-62.
oId. at 862 (footnote omitted).
1 Id.
62 d.at 862-63.
e3 Id.byatIdeaExchange@UAkron,
863.
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reasons, it would have been lawful under section 2. That is to say, it would
then, to use the court's phrase, not have been "unreasonably anti-competitive."
This detailed review of the court of appeals' analysis of the factual and
legal issues in Byars is a necessary foundation for an evaluation of the propriety of the court's formulation of a section 2 liability test. We can now
weigh the propriety of its holding that a refusal to deal by a vertically integrated monopolist must be evaluated under section 2 by reference to a
standard of "unreasonable anti-competitiveness."
A refusal to deal by a monopolist in Bluff City's position will, of course,
always have anti-competitive impact because it is injurious to the terminated
customer-competitor of the vertically integrated monopolist. A court's inquiry under the Byars formulation, therefore, must focus upon whether the
impact is "unreasonable."
Concentration on the "unreasonableness" of a refusal to deal, however,
reduces the test of legality for single-firm conduct under section 2 to the
rule-of-reason test applicable to Section 1 conduct." The "unreasonably
anti-competitive" test adopted by the court in Byars impedes rather than
aids analysis of the legality of single-firm conduct under section 2. What
the Byars court effected, sub silentio, was a merger of section 1 rule-ofreason analysis and section 2 monopolization analysis to yield a separate
standard for evaluating the legality of single-firm refusals by monopolists.
Why any such separate standard is needed or warranted is left unanswered,
of course, but the court's unspoken and erroneous premise is that singlefirm refusals by a monopolist are somehow not susceptible of, or appropriate
for, analysis under conventional section 2 tests. The court may have been
O 4Except for a narrow category of restraints which are presumptively, or per se, unlawful,
such as price fixing, see, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940),
or concerted refusals to deal, see, e.g., Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S.

207 (1959), a court must determine whether joint conduct challenged under Section 1 of
the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 1) produces an unreasonable restraint of trade by evaluating
its impact on the market. It is not enough merely to show that a restraint has occurred;

it must be shown, in addition, that the restraint is unreasonable, see e.g., Standard Oil Co.

v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 61-62 (1911). Whether conduct is "unreasonable" is determined by balancing its procompetitive benefits against its anticompetitive effects:

If, on analysis, the restraint is found to have legitimate business purposes whose realization serves to promote competition, the "anticompetitive evils" of the challenged practice must be carefully balanced against its "procompetitive virtues" to ascertain
whether tho former outweigh the latter. A restraint is unreasonable if it has the "net
effect" of substantially impeding competition.

Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (footnotes omitted).
See generally National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679,
692 (1978). Accord, Borger v. Yamaha Int'l Corp., 625 F.2d 390, 397 (2d Cir. 1980);
Eiberger v. Sony Corp., 622 F.2d 1068, 1076 (2d Cir. 1980); Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. ASCAP, 620 F.2d 930, 934 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, - U.S. - (1981).

There was in Byars, however, no need for the court to resort.to rule-of-reason analysis,
for even under the court's own test of reasonableness, Bluff *City's refusal would have
been reasonable if undertaken to achieve marketing and distribution efficiencies or if
undertaken for legitimate business reasons ("business justifications") unrelated to efficiencies.

See notes 57-63 supra and accompanying text.
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol14/iss4/1
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led to this assumption by its recognition that under certain circumstances
refusals to deal by vertically integrated monopolists may create economies
beneficial to competition at the consumer level, 5 but the fact that this kind
of single-firm conduct may not always damage competition does not warrant
the creation of a hybrid test of legality.
While it is true that the conduct condemned by section 2 is "in large
measure merely the end product . . . of conduct which violates section
, ' the method of analyzing conduct under these separate provisions of
the Sherman Act must take into account the crucial fact that the separate
statutory provisions do indeed have application to different types of conduct."7 While joint conduct constituting monopolization may be reached
under both section 1 and section 2,18 a refusal to deal by a single-firm
monopolist cannot be challenged under section 1. This circumstance
should alone be sufficient to suggest that conventional section 1 rule-of-reason
analysis may not be applicable.
Before demonstrating that section 1 rule-of-reason analysis has no application in evaluating the legality of a unilateral refusal to deal by a
monopolist, it will be helpful to review the section 2 test for unlawful monopolization.
Judge Hand suggested in United States v. Aluminum Company of America (Alcoa) 9 that the attainment of monopoly power would be lawful only
if the monopolist was "the passive beneficiary of the monopoly."7 Later
decisions, however, have expanded the range of business conduct permissible
by a monopolist or by a firm engaged in the attainment of monopoly
power.7"
The most significant of these decisions is Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman
Kodak Co. (Berkey)."7 Berkey Photo, Inc., (Berkey) and Eastman Kodak
Co. (Kodak) had been competitors in the manufacture of cameras and
continued to compete in the processing of color film."' Kodak manufactured
65 609 F.2d at 861. See generally AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 12, at
fusals to Deal, supra note 16, at 1726.

725d; Note, Re-

- United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 106 (1948).
7See generally 2 E. KnrNNER, FEDERAL ANTrrRusT LAW § 16.2 (1980); 1 J. VON KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST LAWS & TRADE REGULATION § 7.01[2] (1979).
68 See e.g., Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); United States v. Terminal
6

R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912).
69 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).

70 d. at 429-30.
71 See generally Robinson, Recent Antitrust Developments

1979, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 1,
2-13 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Robinson]; Comment, Draining the Alcoa "Wishing Well:"
The Section 2 Conduct Requirement After KODAK and CALCOMP, 48 FORDHAM L. REV. 291

(1979); Note, Conduct Standard for Legally Acquired Monopolies under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act, 49 U. CIN. L. REv. 206 (1980).
72 603 F.2d (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980).
7
61d. by
at IdeaExchange@UAkron,
269-71.
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"
color film and paper for developing color film.' Berkey used the paper for
5 and purchasers of Berkey cameras needed the
its own photo processing,"
film for use in those cameras." Between 1954 and 1973 Kodak's share
of the "amateur conventional still camera" market-the relevant camera
market-in the United States never fell below 61 percent of the total annual unit sales for these cameras."' Since 1952, Kodak's share of the market
for photographic film (comprising color print, color slide, color movie
and black and white film) had never fallen below 82 percent of the market
on a unit sales basis.' Kodak's share of the market for color photo finishing
fell from 95 percent in 1954 to 10 percent in 1976,"9 and its share of the
color paper market fell from 94 percent in 1968 to 67 percent in 1975.8'

Berkey brought an action against Kodak alleging monopolization of
these various markets. It attempted to demonstrate at trial that Kodak's introduction in 1972 of its "110 system," the "Pocket Instamatic" camera,
constituted an act of monopolization of the amateur camera market because the new camera could be used only with a new type of film, Kodacolor
8
H, which Kodak had developed specifically for the camera. Berkey urged
that Kodak's failure to provide Berkey advance information sufficient to
enable it to produce and market a competitive camera simultaneously with
the introduction of the 110 system constituted an act of monopolization."
The jury found, among other things, that Kodak's refusal to predisclose
its contemplated introduction of the 110 system and the new film which
was needed for use with it constituted exclusionary conduct in furtherance
8
of Kodak's monopoly position in the camera market. " Judgment was entered
for Berkey; Kodak appealed.
The court of appeals reversed, holding that the trial court's instruction
which permitted the jury to make this finding was erroneous and that "as
a matter of law, Kodak did not have a duty to predisclose information
about the 110 system to competing camera manufacturers."" After turning
aside other grounds that would have supported the jury's damage award
for Kodak's conduct in connection with the introduction of the 110 system
and Kodacolor 11,85 the court of appeals also considered whether Kodak's
14

T5

Id. at 270-71.
Id. at 271.

270.
269.
270.
270-71.
271.
277-79.
82Id. at 279-81.
8ld. at 281.
e ld. at
"1Id. at
T8 Id.at
79 ld. at
BOld. at
81 Id.at

84 Id.

85 ld. at 285-90.
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refusal to predisclose to independent photo finishers, such as Berkey, the
formulae for chemicals used in the finishing process for Kodacolor II and
its refusal to predisclose the kind of equipment that would be needed to
process the film constituted a violation of section 2.80 The court held that
Kodak would not be liable for any conduct "unless it gained a competitive
advantage in these markets [i.e., the markets for photo-finishing and the
sale of equipment used in photo-finishing] by use of the monopoly power
possessed in other segments of the industry.""7 The court concluded that a
new trial would be necessary to resolve the issue:
The instructions to the jury did not draw with sufficient sharpness the
distinction between exercises of power and the natural benefits of size
and integration. Nor is the record so clear that we can say with certainty
on which side of this demarcation the facts fall. The parties quite naturally gave relatively little attention to this aspect of the case in light
of the comparatively small sums involved. If the parties wish to pursue
these claims to a final determination, therefore, a new trial will
be necessary.8 8
Other issues were raised on the appeal, but the foregoing brief review
of the facts is sufficient for present purposes. In concluding as it did that
Kodak was under no duty of predisclosure, either with respect to the 110
system or with respect to the photo-finishing formula and photo-finishing
equipment necessary to process Kodacolor II film, the court sought to
clarify the test for unlawful monopolization.
The court of appeals observed that section 2 does not prohibit monopolies,8 9 but it emphasized that the possessor of monopoly power "may
not wield it to prevent or impede competition."' 0 Citing United States v.
Grinnell Corp. (Grinnell), 1 the court noted that "maintaining or extending
market control by the exercise of that [monopoly] power is sufficient
to complete a violation of § 2."' ' Liability under section 2 by a firm
possessing monopoly power thus turns upon whether or not the firm used
that power - "the power to control prices or exclude competition" 3 in its competitive efforts. The court explained that use of monopoly power is
an action that a firm would have found substantially less effective, or
even counterproductive, if it lacked market control. Thus, the classic
example of such a use is a refusal to deal in goods or services needed
88 Id. at 290-91.

87 ld. at 291.
8 Id. at 292.
89 Id. at 294-95.
90 Id. at 274.
91 382 U.S. 563 (1966).
92 603 F.2d at 274.
93 United States V. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956)
omitted).
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by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1981

(footnote

11

Akron Law Review,
Vol.
14 [1981],
Iss. 4, Art. 1
REVIEW
AKRON
LAW

[Vol. 14:4

by a competitor in a second market. E.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359 . . . (1927). But, a firm
without control of the market that attempts this will simply drive the
purchaser to take its patronage elsewhere."
Stated differently, it is not a violation of section 2 for a firm possessing
monopoly power to engage in competitive activity that is coincidentally
damaging to its competitors. A firm's status as a possessor of monopoly
power does not carry with it the obligation to refrain from competition.
If it did, the "antitrust laws would thus compel the very sloth they were
intended to prevent."9 5 The purpose of the Sherman Act, as the Berkey
court of appeals noted, is not "to maintain friendly business relations among
firms in the same industry nor was it designed to keep those firms happy
and gleeful."" As other courts have explained, a possessor of monopoly
'
power is under no duty to help its competitors "survive or expand," nor
need it "affirmatively assist potential competitors by subsidizing their entry
into the marketplace." 8
Rule-of-reason analysis under section 1, in contrast, stands on different
footing.sa The question in a non-per se section 1 case is not whether the
defendant has by virtue of its position as a monopolist wielded economic
power not available to a firm without monopoly power and which would be
ineffective or counter-productive if exercised by a nonmonopolist. The
question is, instead, "whether an agreement is on balance an unreasonable
restraint of trade, that is, its anti-competitive effects outweigh its pro-competitive effects." 9 The key inquiry under section 1 is not how monopoly
power has been used but rather what has been the impact of this business
conduct on the market. 1' 0
0
In National Society of ProfessionalEngineers v. United States' the Su94

603 F.2d at 291.

95 Id. at 273.

90 Id.at 291.
Business Machines Corp., 613 F.2d
97 California Computer Prods., Inc. v. International
Business Machines Corp.,
International
v.
Corp.
Telex
Accord,
1979).
Cir.
727, 744 (9th
510 F.2d 894, 925-26 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S., 802 (1975).
9
63,526 at
8 Town of Massena v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 1980-2 Trade Cas.
76,814 (N.D.N.Y. 1980).
98a While it might be argued that in referring to reasonableness the Byars court of appeals
did not intend to invoke the rule-of-reason test, as it is known in the cases, but rather
intended only to leave the door open for consideration of possible justifications for a refusal to deal, consideration of justifications is precisely what the rule-of-reason test is all
about. And, as indicated at note 64 supra, the only justification which may be proffered is the
enhancement of competition. By adopting a reasonableness test, the court of appeals thus
necessarily invokes the rule-of-reason.
99 Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. ASCAP, 620 F.2d 930, 934 (2d Cir. 1980),
cert. denied - U.S. - (1981). Accord, Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2. 1173, 1183
(D.C. Cir. 1978). See generally note 64 supra.
-00 See, e.g., Havoco of America, Ltd. v. Shell Oil Co., 626 F.2d 549, 554-55 (7th Cir.
1980); Borger v. Yamaha Int'l Corp., 625 F.2d 390, 397 n. 4 (2d Cir. 1980).
101435 U.S. 679 (1978).
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preme Court stressed that the reasonableness of a restraint under Section 1
must be ascertained by evaluating its effect on the market."' If the "net effect"
of the restraint is substantially to impede competition, then it is unreasonable
under the rule of reason and unlawful under section 1.101 Single-firm conduct
by a monopolist, however, is not necessarily susceptible to this kind of analysis."" Consider, for example, the business justification defense advanced by the
court of appeals in Byars. Applying an "unreasonably anti-competitive" test,
the court of appeals proposed that Bluff City's refusal to deal with plaintiff
would have been lawful under section 2 if done in order to enable Bluff
City better to control the return of unsold periodical copies so it could
obtain affidavit privileges. 5 Analyzed under the single-firm monopolization
test of Berkey, the refusal to deal would be permissible, since it would not
arise from the use of monopoly power. Analyzed under the rule-of-reason,
however, the competitive disadvantages of the refusal to deal would surely
outweigh the competitive benefits; it would be unlawful if it were the product
of joint conduct. The anti-competitive effects of the refusal to deal-total
elimination of price and service competition-would be offset by no competitive benefits, since, as the court of appeals itself noted in Byars, the business justification defense would not necessarily require demonstration of
customer benefits.""
The recent decision by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in
California Computer Products, Inc. v. International Business Machines
Corp.""' offers a further example of the inapplicability of the section 1 ruleof-reason analysis to single-firm conduct by a monopolist challenged under
section 2. The plaintiff, California Computer Products, Inc. (CalComp),
manufactured certain disc products, part of a larger category of "peripheral
equipment," for use with central data processing units manufactured by the
02 Id. at 691-92.

Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
Citing Byars, 609 F.2d 843, 860 (6th Cir. 1979), the Fifth Circuit volunteered in MidTexas Communications Systems, Inc. v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co., 615 F.2d
1372, 1389 n. 13 (1980), cert. denied, 101 Sup. Ct. 286, (1980) that "[lt is clear ... that the
analysis under section 2 is similar to that under section 1 regardless whether the rule of
reason label is applied per se." The Ninth Circuit remarked in California Computer Prods.,
Inc. v. International Business Machines Corp., 613 F.2d 727 (1979), that a defendant's acts
are properly analyzed for legality under section 2.
analogously to contracts, combinations and conspiracies under § 1 of the Sherman Act:
the test is whether the defendant's acts, otherwise lawful, were unreasonably restrictive
of competition.
Id. at 735-36 (emphasis in original; footnote omitted). As will be shown below at notes
105-16 and accompanying text, these kinds of dicta overlook crucial differences separating
section 2 analysis of single-firm conduct from analysis of joint conduct under section 1.
103

104

105 609 F.2d at 862-63.

' See id. In any event, evidence of business justification is irrelevant under rule-of-reason
analysis except insofar as it establishes procompetitive benefits prodlvce4 by the restraint
under review. See note 167 infra and accompanying text.
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8
defendant, International Business Machines Corp. (IBM) and others."
CalComp alleged that IBM had violated section 2 by cutting prices on
disc products."'° The record showed that IBM had repeatedly cut prices on
the products in response to price cuts by competitors, including CalComp,
110
to the point that it was no longer profitable for CalComp to compete.
Even though IBM had reduced its prices, the evidence showed that it still
1
continued to sell the disc products at a profit. '

In evaluating the legality of IBM's price cuts, the court of appeals
framed the issue before it as follows:
The test of the reasonableness of the foregoing pricing actions, and the
principal question facing us in this case is whether IBM . . . had the
right to respond to the lower prices of its competitors with reduced,
'
but still substantially profitable, prices on its own products."
The court held that the price cuts did not violate section 2:
Rather, IBM's price cuts were a part of the very competitive process
the Sherman Act was designed to promote. To accept CalComp's
position would be to hold that IBM could not compete if competition
would result in injury to its competitors, an ill-advised reversal of
Act is meant
the Supreme Court's pronouncement that the Sherman
1 13
to protect the competitive process, not competitors.
Rule-of-reason analysis simply would not fit these facts. If rule-ofreason analysis were applied, IBM would have been found liable, because
the harm to competition from IBM's price-cutting could not possibly be
offset by any countervailing benefits to competition. Although purchasers
of disc products benefited from IBM's conduct by being able to purchase
the products at a reduced price, IBM's aggressive response to price-cutting
by its competitors caused CalComp loss of revenue,"' and, presumably,
loss of market share. It enhanced IBM's dominance in the market while
15
impairing CalComp's and other manufacturers' ability to compete.'
The recognition by the court of appeals in Byars, that a refusal to deal
by a single-firm vertically integrating monopolist may under certain circumstances produce efficiencies beneficial to competition does not justify
the creation of a separate, hybrid standard for evaluation of the legality of
that conduct under section 2. Without considering how sections 1 and 2
should be harmonized generally, it is sufficient to note simply that single1Id. at 731.
1o9 Id.
'1'

Id. at 739-41.

"I Id. at 741.
12

Id. at 741-42.

I18 Id. at 742.
114 Id.

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol14/iss4/1
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firm conduct by a monopolist can best be evaluated under the Berkey test,
if only because the factual predicate for meaningful rule-of-reason evaluation-measurement of competitive benefits against competitive disadvantages-may in many cases be missing when single-firm conduct by a possessor of monopoly power is reviewed. The Byars opinion is devoid of any
meaningful section 2 analysis, and the Sixth Circuit's postulation of an
"unreasonably anti-competitive" test to evaluate conduct properly tested
under the monopolization test of Berkey and similar cases" 6 can lead only to
further confusion about the legality of refusals to deal by single-firm
monopolists.
Not all refusals by a vertically integrated monopolist adversely affecting
its competitors have been held potentially violative of section 2. The Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently ruled in Cowley v. Braden Industries, Inc., ' that a distributor termination by a firm possessing 70 percent
of the national windmill market did not violate section 2 even though the
firm, Aeromotor, was itself engaged, through its branches, in direct competition with the terminated distributor." 8
While noting that Aeromotor possessed monopoly power in the relevant market, whether the market was viewed nationally or by focusing
on Colorado and Arizona where plaintiffs, a distributor and a retailer of
Aeromotor products, had been engaged in business,"' the court held that
the plaintiffs had failed to satisfy the second prong of the Grinnell test: they
had failed to show that the monopoly power of defendant had been willfully
acquired or maintained."' The court noted, without analysis, that plaintiff
had introduced "no evidence that Aeromotor [had] acquired or maintained
its market position through the use of predatory conduct."'' It further noted
that plaintiff had "failed to prove its allegation that Aeromotor used its
dominant position in the windmill market (in which it had monopoly power)
to improve its pump sales by tying pump sales to windmill sales."' 22 Finally, the court noted that certain territorial limitations imposed on distributors by Aeromotor, which the court had earlier in the opinion held not
to violate section 1 of the Sherman Act under either the rule of reason
or the per se test,' were not used by Aeromotor in the windmill market
' 24
"with predatory intent.'
The presence or absence of "predatory intent" is, of course, not the
216See note 71 supra for articles reviewing similar cases.
117

613 F.2d 751 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.W. 3767 (1980).

11 8

Id. at 753, 755.

119 Id. at 756.
120

Id.

'i1 Id.
22 Id.
128

Id. at 754-55.
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measure of unlawful monopolization. While proof of such an intent may
be necessary to establish attempted monopolization, where "a specific in5
tent to destroy competition or build monopoly" is an element of proof,"
characterization of motive as "predatory" adds nothing to monopolization
2 7 whether conduct by a firm posanalysis.' 26 Rather, as discussed above,
sessing monopoly power constitutes unlawful monopolization turns instead
upon whether or not that conduct arises from the exercise of the monopoly
power and could not otherwise be effectuated. Under this test, the court
of appeals' disposition of plaintiff's monopolization count in Cowley was
2
proper even if its reasoning was not. The conclusion was proper because
Aeromotor, in terminating plaintiff Cowley as its Arizona distributor, was
engaging in conduct consistent with rational business behavior by a nonmonopolist, and the exercise of that conduct in no way depended upon the
possession and exercise of monopoly power by Aeromotor. A brief review
of the facts giving rise to the litigation confirms this analysis.
In appointing a distributor, Aeromotor agreed that its branches would
not compete with the distributor in the distributor's territory."' Additionally,
Aeromotor's policy discouraged distributors from selling within the territory
A distributor could sell outside its territory only
of another distributor.'
if the goods were first sent to the selling distributor's territory and were
placed in the stock of the selling distributor.' When plaintiff Cowley, the
Aeromotor distributor for Arizona, began selling windmills to purchasers
in Colorado, including Carder (a retailer who joined Cowley as plaintiff)
without first shipping the windmills through Arizona, Aeromotor's Colorado
1
distributor complained to Aeromotor. "' Aeromotor in return warned Cowley against this practice and subsequently terminated Cowley when it ignored
3
Aeromotor's requests to stop selling to Carder. Thus, Aeromotor's termination of Cowley was fully consistent with Aeromotor's previously announced distribution policies, and it in no way depended upon the possession
of monopoly power for its justification or execution.
25 Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 626 (1953).
See generally AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 12, at 626a.

126

See notes 89-98 supra and accompanying text.
in128 For a recent decision in which a district court found, on a motion for preliminary
junction, a probable violation of section 2 when a manufacturer of heavy equipment terminated the sale of replacement parts to a firm engaged in servicing the equipment, see Kresl
63,554 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
Power Equipment, Inc. v. Acco Inds., Inc., 1980-2 Trade Cas.
As did the court of appeals in Byars (see notes 61-63 supra and accompanying text), the
district court erroneously evaluated the legality of the refusal by reference to defendant's
motives and held that "defendant had the burden to show a reasonable business justification
for its action." Id. at 76,956.
129 613 F.2d at 753.
130 Id.
231 Id.
132 Id. at 753-54.
127
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A comparable result was reached by the Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit in Homefinders of America, Inc. v. Providence Journal Co. (Homefinders).'" Although the defendant was not vertically integrated, the case
is nonetheless closely analogous to vertical integration cases because the defendant was a supplier of plaintiff in one market and a competitor of plaintiff in an adjacent market. Plaintiff in Homefinders was a franchisor of
businesses engaged in the sale of lists of apartment properties. Walker,
plaintiff's former Rhode Island franchisee, brought an action, in which
his franchisor was later joined, against the publisher of the Providence
Journal, a newspaper of general circulation in Providence, Rhode Island,
alleging that its refusal to accept classified advertising from Walker eventually forced him out of business and caused the franchisor, Homefinders,
antitrust injury.'
Walker's sole activity as a franchisee was the sale and maintenance
of lists of rental properties."' He advertised for the sale of a list by placing
in the classified section of the Journal advertisements which appeared to
be for individual rental properties. The advertising was in fact, however,
simply bait, and a reader calling about a particular property would be advised that if he or she wanted complete information about the property
it would be necessary to purchase the appropriate list from Walker." '
The Journal received frequent complaints about Walker's ads (including
some from the Better Business Bureau) and it eventually determined not
to run them.'" 8

Homefinders lost in the trial court and made no effort on appeal to

dispute the fact that the ads were misleading. Plaintiff did contend, however,
that the refusal by the Journal to run the classified advertising constituted an

act of unlawful monopolization. Reviewing the case after the district court
had tried it on the merits and dismissed the complaint, the court of appeals
affirmed the dismissal, holding that the Journal's conduct did not constitute

unlawful monopolization.
The court of appeals, in an opinion written by Judge Aldrich, summarily disposed of plaintiff's monopolization contention. Without discussing

the principles of Grinnell or related cases, the court began by simply observing that even if the Journal did have monopoly power and even if the
plaintiffs were a competitor of the Journal (in the classified advertising
market), these circumstances would not require the Journal "to immolate
itself" by accepting fraudulent advertising.'
The court went on to note
13621 F.2d 441 (1st Cir. 1980).
185

Id.

'Be Id.
1

3

Id. at 442.

188 Id.
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that the Sherman Act "is not aimed at reasonable conduct, and it is not
unreasonable for a newspaper to refuse misleading advertising that offends its
readers and could turn them away from its classified columns altogether."""
Citing Byars, Gamco, Inc. v. Providence Fruit & ProduceBldg., Inc.," and
"
America's Best Cinema Corp. v. Fort Wayne Newspapers, Inc., " the court
observed that the defendant was free to refuse to deal with a party who so
1
lowered the standards of its advertising. , The court concluded this part
of its discussion by noting that the plaintiff "fails to distinguish between
legally attempting to maintain a monopoly position and protecting one's
assets.'" "
The Doric simplicity of the Homefinders opinion should not obsecure
the fact that the court's disposition of the section 2 claim is unassailable.
Plaintiff's wrongful conduct, damaging not only to the Journal but to the
"5 Although
public at large, was the only reason for the refusal to deal.
the refusal had anticompetitive consequences because plaintiff and defendant were both competitors in the market for the advertising of apartments, those consequences were an incidental effect of reasonable steps
that defendant took to protect its goodwill and business position. The refusal to deal falls far short of the kind of exercise of monopoly power identified in Berkey as necessary to establish a violation of section 2. Although the
court of appeals was content simply to note that the Sherman Act "is not
aimed at reasonable conduct," its holding in light of the facts of the case
is entirely consistent with proper standards for evaluating monopolization.
Its reliance on Byars does not alter this fact.
2. Refusal by a Monopolist to Grant Access to an Essential Facility
Single-firm refusals to deal can also occur when the holder of monopoly
power has control over a facility, service or product, access to which is
essential to the business success of a competitor of the monopolist. Joint
conduct barring access to such facility, service or product has repeatedly
been challenged under section 1 of the Sherman Act."" The same joint
Id.
141 194 F.2d 484, 487-88 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 817 (1952).
142 347 F. Supp. 328, 333-34 (N.D. Ind. 1972).
14o

14'

621 F.2d at 443.

I41d., citing Otter Tail, 410 U.S. at 380-82: Byars, 609 F.2d at 863 and n. 55; and International Railways v. United Brands Co., 532 F.2d 231, 239-40 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 835 (1976).
245

621 F.2d at 443.

I" See e.g., Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); United States v.
Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912); Hecht v. Pro Football, Inc.,
570 F.2d 982 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 956 (1978); Helix Milling Co. v.
Terminal Flour Mills Co., 523 F.2d 1317 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1053
(1976); Venzie Corp. v. United States Mineral Prod. Co., 521 F.2d 1309 (3d Cir. 1975);
Gamco, Inc. v. Providence Fruit & Produce Bldg., Inc., 194 F.2d 484 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
344 U.S. 817 (1952); American Federation of Tobacco Growers, Inc. v. Neal, 183 F.2d 18
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol14/iss4/1
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conduct has also been challenged under section 2.147

One of the few cases, if not the only case, challenging single-firm
control by a non-integrated monopolist'41 over an essential service or facility

is Mid-Texas Communications Systems, Inc. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. (Mid-Texas Communications)."' It was there alleged by a telephone
company, Woodlands Telecommunications Corporation (WTC), in competition with Southwestern Bell Telephone Company (Bell) that Bell had
violated the monopolization proscription of section 2 by refusing to permit
WTC to interconnect with existing Bell telephone lines so WTC could
offer long-distance service. 5 '
WTC was a joint venture, to which plaintiff, Mid-Texas Communications Systems, Inc., was a party, formed for the purpose of providing telephone service in the Woodlands, a new residential development outside of
Houston, Texas. 5' If WTC was to provide adequate telephone service, it
needed to interconnect with Bell's existing interstate network so its customers would have long distance service. It was also necessary to secure
the Bell system's cooperation to obtain NNX codes, the three-digit prefix
for all phone numbers.' 52
When WTC requested NNX codes and interconnection with its proposed new telephone system, Bell refused to cooperate. Bell planned to
serve the area itself, and it reasoned that the establishment of a new independent telephone company was contrary to the public interest and
53
would constitute a wasteful duplication of facilities."
Following a trial,
the jury returned a verdict, which, after trebling by the court, was approximately $55 million. 54 The court of appeals reversed and remanded for a
new trial.
Only one of the issues on appeal need concern us here: WTC's claim
that Bell's refusal to deal with it in the long-distance market constituted a
willful misuse of monopoly power in violation of section 2.111 After noting
that the district court had erroneously instructed the jury on the effect reguSee, e.g., Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 438 F.2d
1286 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972); Murphy Tugboat Co. v. Shipowners & Merchants Towboat Co., 1979-1 Trade Cas. $ 62,527 at 77,041-42 (N.D. Cal.
1979).
148 The legality under section 2 of denial of access to an essential service or facility by a
vertically integrated monopolist was addressed in Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States,
410 U.S. 366, 377-78 (1973), and Town of Massena v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp.,
1980-2 Trade Cas. 63,526 at 76,812-13 (N.D.N.Y. 1980).
149615 F.2d 1372 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 286 (1980).
0
15 Id. at 1376-77.
5
1 1 Id. at 1376.
2

153 Id.

153 Id.
15 Id. at 1375-76.
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lation of Bell by governmental agencies would have on whether or not Bell
possessed monopoly power, 5 ' the court of appeals turned to consider
whether, even assuming Bell were shown to possess monopoly power, its
refusal to interconnect constituted a violation of section 2.
The court began by noting that even if Bell were shown to possess
monopoly power, "liability under Sherman Act Section 2 exists only if the
jury finds that Bell abused its monopoly power by acting 'in an unreasonably
exclusionary manner' relative to its competitors." 5 7 The court then held,
citing Byars again, that, "as a general principle, section 2 prohibits only
those refusals to deal which under the particular circumstances of a case
are unreasonably anticompetitive."" 8
Bell argued that whether the refusal to interconnect was reasonable
required consideration of the impact of government regulation on Bell's
actions. 5 Bell urged that the jury should have been instructed that it could
take into consideration Bell's contention that its primary justification for
refusing interconnection was its belief that interconnection was contrary
to the public interest as defined in section 201 (a) of the Communications
Act of 1934100 because it would result in duplication of facilities in The
Woodlands area. 1' The court of appeals reduced the matter to this proposition:

Bell's position is that the refusal was not arbitrary or motivated by anticompetitive intent, but instead was proper because Bell believed that

WTC's request was contrary to the public interest. If Bell was correct

in its assessment, and if its purpose in refusing interconnection was to
vindicate the public interest, then the refusal, despite its obvious antihave been proper and entitled to protection
competitive effect, would
1 2
scrutiny.
antitrust
from
The court then held that the jury should have been instructed that it could
Bell's conduct by taking into account the
consider the reasonableness of '1
"relevant regulatory framework. 6 3
Following the lead of the Byars court, the Fifth Circuit ignored conventional section 2 principles and relied upon a hybrid standard for the
evaluation of a unilateral refusal to deal by a firm possessing monopoly
power: whether the refusal is "unreasonably anticompetitive." It did so by
remarking that "[i]t is clear . . . that the analysis under section 2 is similar
5
1 61d. at 1387.
15

citing Byars v. Bluff City News Co., 609 F.2d 843, 853 (6th Cir. 1979).
Id. at 1389.
259 Id.
7 ld.

158

16047 U.S.C. § 201(a)

(1976).

F.2d at 1389.
16 1d. at 1390 (emphasis added; footnote omitted).
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to that under section 1 regardless whether the rule of reason label is applied
per se."1 ' The only authority cited for this glib pronouncement is, not surprisingly, the Byars case. As has already been shown above, however, the
importation of section 1 rule-of-reason standards into a section 2 singlefirm monopolization case compounds rather than eases analytical difficulties.
In any event, the simple fact of the matter is that the court of appeals
in Mid-Texas Communications did not engage in rule-of-reason analysis. It
did not weigh the anticompetitive effects of Bell's refusal to interconnect
against the competitive benefits of the refusal. Indeed, it acknowledged, in
the passage quoted above,' that the refusal would have been lawful "despite its obvious anticompetitive effect" if Bell's purpose was the prevention
of competition, i.e., the avoidance of duplication of facilities. The refusal
would be lawful if Bell had an adequate "justification," such as a belief
that Congress has already made the determination that duplication
of telephone facilities is contrary to the public interest, competitive consequences to the contrary notwithstanding."' Under rule-of-reason analysis,
evidence of justification other than the promotion of competition is not
even relevant.'
The court's instincts were correct, however, even if its language was
not. Under the section 2 test refined by the court of appeals in Berkey, Bell's
conduct would not have been a use of monopoly power. Bell's refusal was
a rational response to WTC's potential competition, would have made
sound business and economic sense, and could have been effected even if
Bell had not possessed monopoly power. The court of appeals' misplaced
reliance on Byars does not alter these facts.
B.

Refusals to Deal with Noncompetitors
The legality of a unilateral refusal to deal by a firm possessing monopoly
power has also been addressed in connection with refusals to deal with
certain categories of noncompetitors. The courts and the Federal Trade
Commission have found violations of section 2 by single firms in three
separate settings:
1. Refusal to deal with a customer of a competitor;" 8
2. Refusal to deal with a distributor; and

'16 d. at 1389 n. 13.
65 See note 162 supra and accompanying text.
266615 F.2d at 1389.
167 E.g., Mardirosian v. American Institute of Architects, 474 F. Supp. 628, 648-49 (D.D.C.

1979). See generally Robinson, supra note 71, at 15-26.
168Eg., Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 154 (1951); Kansas City Star

Co. v. United States, 240 F.2d 643, 654-55 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 923 (1957);
Banana Distributors, Inc. v. United Fruit Co., 162 F. Supp. 32, 37 (S.D.N.Y. 1958);
Greenleaf v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 79 F. Supp. 362, 364-65 (E.D. Pa. 1947)..
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3. Refusal to deal with a customer where the firm possessing monopoly
power controls an essential facility.
The second and third categories of single-firm conduct adversely affecting
noncompetitors are discussed below. The first category need not be reviewed, since the courts have ventured no specialized tests of section 2
legality for cases falling within it.106
1. Refusal to Deal With a Distributor
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit had occasion to evaluate
the legality under section 2 of a refusal to deal with a customer in Sargent°
Welch Scientific Company v. Ventron Corporation (Sargent-Welch)."
The defendant, through its Cahn division, manufactured and sold electhrough dealtromagnetic microbalances. 17' It marketed the microbalances
2
Sargent-Welch.1
plaintiff,
was
which
of
ers, one
Cahn terminated Sargent-Welch in 1971 on the grounds that (1) its
purchases from Cahn had been decreasing each year since 1968, (2) it
had refused to market Cahn's new line of millibalances and (3) it had been
promoting the Cahn microbalances inadequately in advertising and at trade
shows.'
Sargent-Welch sued Ventron Corporation, alleging that the termination
was in furtherance of price-fixing, tying and monopolization. Only the monopolization claim need be addressed here. The district court defined the
relevant market in such a way as to include all precision balances, thereby
giving Cahn only 8 percent of the market.1 4 The court of appeals reversed
this definition of relevant market and held, instead, that the district court
should have evaluated Cah's market power by reference to a separate
submarket for microbalances."' It held that Calm had a monopoly in the
electromagnetic microbalance submarket.'
T

The court of appeals then considered whether Cahn's termination of
Sargent-Welch may have been motivated by Sargent-Welch's refusal to handle
its millibalances. The court reasoned that if termination was a use of monopoly power in the microbalances submarket to further sales of millibalances by remaining dealers it would have been a misuse of monopoly power
in violation of section 2.1" The court concluded, however, that it was not
269 See cases cited at note 168 supra.
170 567 F.2d 701 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 822 (1978).

Id. at 704-05.
2R1
1TS Id. at 705.
17B Id.
14 Id. at 706.
"25Id. at 711.
171Id.

177 Id at 713.
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in a position to determine from the record as it presently stood whether
in fact Cahn's dealer reduction program and its termination of Sargent-Welch
had this as their purpose. It remanded the section 2 claim for further findings.17
The court's conclusion that Cahn's purpose in undertaking the actions
complained of was dispositive of their legality is puzzling, to say the least.
The court began its analysis of this branch of the case by noting that a
specific intent to monopolize need not be shown to prove monopolization."'
It then recited the conventional wisdom that conduct which would be lawful
if undertaken by a firm without monopoly power may be unlawful under
section 2 if done by a monopolist. 8 ' Then, citing Eastman Kodak v. Southern
Photo Materials Co. (Eastman Kodak),'" the court observed that the "anticompetitive quality of an act may depend, however, upon the purpose with
which it was done." '8 2 From this, the court reasoned that the lawfulness of
Cahn's termination of Sargent-Welch "depends upon Cahn's purpose ....11
While noting that the termination of Sargent-Welch would not be
unlawful if undertaken for the purpose of enhancing the efficiency of Cahn's
marketing efforts, the court nonetheless believed that the same conduct,
producing the same effect, would be converted into a violation of section
2 if undertaken with a purpose to force dealers to handle millibalances or
to punish Sargent-Welch for its refusal to handle millibalances.'
The court of appeals correctly read the Eastman Kodak case as support for this kind of analysis. The Supreme Court there held that the district
court properly submitted for the jury's determination the question whether
Kodak's refusal to sell its photographic supplies to a competitor in Atlanta
at dealers' discounts was "in pursuance of a purpose to monopolize." '
The unmistakable implication of the ruling in Eastman Kodak is that proof
of monopolization requires more than simply proof that the defendant intended to take the actions which caused the effect the plaintiff complains of.
The plaintiff must demonstrate that the action complained of was "in pursuance of a purpose to monopolize."
To the extent Eastman Kodak can be read to hold that proof of
monopolization requires more than simply demonstrating that the defendant took the actions constituting the alleged monopolization knowing that
1t Id.

567 F.2d at 711, citing United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 105 (1948).
280 567 F.2d at 711-12.
181273 U.S. 359, 375 (1927).
1i8567 F.2d at 712.
180 Id.
;a4 Id. at 712-13.
285 273 U.S. at 375.
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s
he was taking the actions, it directly conflicts with United States v. Griffith, '
also cited by the court of appeals in Sargent-Welch. The government
charged in Griffith that the members of a film exhibitor circuit operating
movie theatres in Oklahoma, Texas and New Mexico had combined and
conspired to negotiate agreements with film distributors which had, among
other things, the effect of monopolizing the exhibition of films in many
communities." ' The district court found no liability under section 2 because it reasoned that the defendants had not engaged in the conduct complained of for the "avowed purpose of eliminating competition and of acquiring a monopoly of theatres in the several towns."18

The Supreme Court ruled that it was an error for the district court
to require such proof of purpose:
It is, however, not always necessary to find a specific intent to restrain
trade or to build a monopoly in order to find that the anti-trust laws
have been violated. It is sufficient that a restraint of trade or monopoly
results as a consequence of a defendant's conduct or business arrangements. . . . To require a greater showing would cripple the
Act. . . . And so, even if we accept the District Court's findings that
appellees had no intent or purpose unreasonably to restrain trade or
to monopolize, we are left with the question whether a necessary and
direct result of the master agreements was the restraining or monopolizing of trade within the meaning of the Sherman Act.
... When the buying power of the entire circuit is used to negotiate films for his competitive as well as his closed towns, he is using
monopoly power to expand his empire. And even if we assume that
a specific intent to accomplish that result is absent, he is chargeable
in legal contemplation with that purpose since the end result is the
necessary and direct consequence of what he did.'
The purpose test relied upon by the court in Sargent-Welch thus has no
place in the evaluation of legality of conduct under the monopolization
branch of section 2.'90 Proof of anticompetitive purpose or specific intent
to accomplish an unlawful result is, as the Supreme Court noted in Griffith,
"necessary only where the acts fall short of the results condemned by the
U.S. 100 (1948).
sT87d. at 101-03.
288 Id. at 105.
18-334

189

Id. at 105-06, 108.

626a at 76-77. But see City of Mishawaka v.
190 See AREEDA & TuRNER, supra note 12,
(7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W.
985
976,
F.2d
616
Co.,
Power
Electric
American
3494 (1981) (specific intent must be shown where a defendant is regulated utility). For a
recent decision in which a court mistakenly believed intent to be dispositive, see Local 1330
63,486 at 76,568-69 (6th Cir. 1980), in
v. United States Steel Corp., 1980-2 Trade Cas.
which the Sixth Circuit reversed the lower court's dismissal of a complaint alleging .the
exercise of monopoly power "for the purpose of preventing a potential competitor from
entering the steel market." id. at 76,568. The complaint alleges a section 2 -violation in
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol14/iss4/1
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Act."19 Under section 2, evidence of specific intent is relevant only
to a claim of attempted monopolization or conspiracy to monopolize.
Ignoring the court of appeals' holding with respect to intent, the
court's analysis in Sargent-Welch nonetheless reflects an awareness, not
shared by the Byars or Mid-Texas Communications courts, that the evaluation of a single-firm refusal to sell under the monopolization provision of
section 2 neither requires nor warrants attention to any different standards
than those applicable to the evaluation of single-firm conduct generally.
A recent decision by the Federal Trade Commission under section 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act' reflects, in contrast, no such awareness and constitutes a radical departure from established analysis of the
legality of refusals to deal.
2. Refusal to Deal by a Monopolist Causing Competitive Injury in
Another Market
The Federal Trade Commission recently had occasion to consider
the duty of a monopolist to deal with noncompetitors in need of a service
or product offered by the monopolist. The Commission concluded in
193 that the respondent,
Reuben H. Donnelley Corporation
The Reuben H.
Donnelley Corporation (Donnelley), engaged in an unfair trade practice
under section 5(a) of the FTC Act"' when it listed in the Official Airline
Guide (OAG), which it alone published, the flights offered by commuter
airlines and intrastate airlines differently from the major airlines certificated
by the Civil Aeronautics Board. Although the Commission exercised its
authority under section 5 of the FTC Act, its analysis rested on section 2
of the Sherman Act and could arguably be invoked under section 2 by
a private litigant or by the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice.
It therefore warrants close attention here.
The facts can be simply stated. The Commission found that the OAG
is the only complete listing of scheduled flights in North America, and it is
the "main source of flight schedule information for the flying public and a
191 334 U.S. at 105.
292

15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976).

TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
21,650, rev'd sub. nona., Official Airline Guides, Inc. v. FTC,
1980-2 Trade Cas. 63,544 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, - U.S. - (1981).
194 Section 5(a) of 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1976)
provides in pertinent part as follows:
(1) Unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive
acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are declared unlawful.
(2) The Commission is empowered and directed to prevent persons, partnerships,
or corporations, except banks, common carriers subject to the Acts to regulate commerce, air carriers and foreign air carriers subject to the Federal Aviation Act of
1958 [49 U.S.C. 1301 et. seq.], and persons, partnerships, or corporations insofar as
they are subject to the Packers and Stockyards Act, 1921, as amended [7 U.S.C. 181
et. seq.], except as provided in section 406(b) of said Act [7 U.S.C. 227(a)], from
using unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce and unfair or-deceptive
193

or practices in or affecting
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primary marketing tool for air carriers.""' The OAG is recognized in the
industry as "unique and indispensable. 1 8 The Commission therefore concluded that the guide constituted a separate product market. 9 '
After noting that certificated and non-certificated carriers compete
for many of the same passengers, 98 the Commission turned to consider
whether Donnelley engaged in an unfair method of competition when,
acting unilaterally, it failed to publish in the OAG connecting flight information for commuter carriers and to combine in it the flight schedule
listings of all three classes of carriers.' 99 Commissioner Pitofsky, writing
for the Commission, stated the issue for determination this way:
[T]he second ground [on which the administrative law judge found a
violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act] raises a policy issue which has
perplexed antitrust cognoscenti for decades - whether antitrust liability may attach to practices of a monopolist which are not related
to achieving or maintaining its monopoly power, but which are arbitrary and result in competitive injury to customers, suppliers, or
others vulnerable to its monopoly power."°
The Commission embarked on its legal analysis by pointing out how:
this case differs from ordinary monopolization cases where challenged
acts or practices were engaged in to benefit the monopolist competitively, either in the market in which the monopoly power existed
or in some adjacent market into which the monopolist had extended
its operations.20 1
It observed that this case was not, for example, like United States v. United

Shoe Machinery Corp.,2 in which United Shoe Machinery Corporation had engaged in practices damaging to its actual and potential competitors in the market in which it possessed monopoly power, the production
of shoe machinery.2' The Commission noted that "[h]ere, by contrast,
none of Donnelley's challenged acts is alleged to have maintained or enhanced its monopoly power in the market the OAG dominates." ' "
The Commission also noted, by way of example, that this is not a
case like Otter Tail,"' in which the Supreme Court found a violation of
section 2 because, among other reasons, "Otter Tail had used its monopoly
21,650 at 21,801 and 21,809.
196 Id.at 21,809.

195

297

Id.

198 Id. at 21,809-10.
199 Id. at 21,815.
2oo Id. at 21,801.
201
202

Id. at 21,815.
110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), afi'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).

21,650 at 21,815-16.
Id. at 21,816.
20 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
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power in one market (transmission lines) to enhance monopoly in another

market (retail distribution)

.''"

The Commission explained that "Don-

nelley's policies, which have affected competition in the air transportation
market, were not intended to benefit Donnelley in that market," because
Donnelley was not engaged in business in the market. 0 7
The Commission then noted candidly that the "question we are presented with is outside the mainstream of law concerning monopolies
and monopolization."2 8 Undaunted by the uncharted waters, it concluded
nonetheless that a monopolist has an obligation "not to injure customers."2 9
It found support for this conclusion in an earlier Commission decision,
210
Grand Caillou Packing Co. (LaPeyre).
The issue before the Commission in LaPeyre was whether the only
manufacturer of machinery used for peeling shrimp, LaPeyre, engaged in
an unfair method of competition when it leased the machinery to canners
located in the Northwest at twice the rate it leased the machinery to those
located on the Gulf Coast. The same family who owned the machinery
manufacturing company also owned Grand Caillou, a shrimp canning
business on the Gulf Coast.2 1' The Commission relied upon this dual ownership to conclude that the discriminatory pricing policy for the equipment
leases was an unfair method of competition because it was intended to
212
protect Grand Caillou from the competition of the Northwest canners.
Citing Associated Press.. and Terminal Railroad, " ' Commissioner Elman
noted in a concurring opinion in LaPeyre that firms possessing monopoly
power are subject, "under the antitrust laws, to some of the obligations
of fair and equal treatment borne by publicly regulated utilities." 15 Commissioner Elman then made the following observation about the duty to
deal:
The short of it is that respondents' insistence on charging a monopoly
price may well result in the destruction of a substantial segment of the
shrimp canning industry. This result, which is not dictated by efficiency-for, to repeat, the cost of processing shrimp by machine is
the same regardless of the size of the shrimp-but by monopoly power,
is clearly opposed to the objectives of antitrust policy. The right of a
monopolist to exploit his monopoly (whether such monopoly is conferred
206

21,650 at 21,816 (footnote omitted).

Id.
208
Id.
207
0

2 9

Id. at 21,817.

21065 FTC 799 (1964), afl'd sub. nom., LaPeyre v. FTC, 366 F.2d 117 (5th Cir. 1966).

21165 FTC at 800.
212 ld. at 848.
218 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
214224 U.S. 383 (1912).
215 65byFTC
at 868.
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by patents or otherwise) by charging a monopolist's discriminatory price
does not, in my opinion, include the right to destroy or cripple a major
segment of an industry, but must yield in such a case to the policy
of competition embodied in the antitrust laws . . . . In the circumstances, respondents' refusal to treat the Northwest and the Gulf
Coast shrimp canners on equal terms is an abuse of monopoly power. 1 '
The Commission placed great reliance in Donnelley upon Commissioner
Elman's concurring LaPeyre opinion, 1 ' and it drew additional support for
its conclusion that a monopolist has a duty not to injure customers from
the Fifth Circuit's opinion which affirmed the Commission's disposition of
LaPeyre. The court of appeals there made the following pertinent observation:
[T]he problem of this case is . . . the duty of a lawful monopolist
to conduct its business in such a way as to avoid inflicting competitive
injury on a class of customers . . . . Both the majority and Commissioner Elman found that the central characteristic [of respondents'
conduct] was the same-the utilization of monopoly power in one
market resulting in discrimination and the curtailment of competition in another . . . . [T]here is abundant evidence in the record
in support of the Commission's conclusion that Peelers leasing procedure is innately discriminatory and anti-competitive in its effect and
that in circumstances of the instant case, the refusal to treat the
Northwest and the Gulf Coast shrimp canners on equal terms has
substantially and unjustifiably injured competition in the shrimp canning industry. It is therefore an unfair method of competition forbidden by Section 5.15
The Commission drew further support from a dictum in a recent
Fifth Circuit case, Fulton v. Hecht.219 There, plaintiff, who raised racing greyhounds, alleged that the defendant, the operator of dog racing
tracks in south Florida, violated section 2 of the Sherman Act when it
refused to renew plaintiffs racing contract. 2 Plaintiff claimed, among other
things, that under section 2 a monopolist has a duty to deal fairly with
221
The court of
anyone who seeks to compete in an adjacent market.
appeals, citing LaPeyre, acknowledged that this might be true under section
5 of the FTC Act but reasoned that "[s]uch a duty is no help to the instant
plaintiff because his action is based on § 2 of the Sherman Act, and there
is no private cause of action for violation of the FTC Act."22
Id. at 868-69.
21,650 at 21,816-17.
218 366 F.2d at 120-21.
219 580 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 981 (1979). See notes 287-99 infra
and accompanying text for a discussion of this case.
20 Id. at 1245-46.
221 Id.at 1247.
232 Id. n. 2 at 1249.
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After citing Fulton v. Hecht, the Commission then turned its attention
to what it characterized as "collateral lines of authority which support
imposition of some duty on a monopolist not to discriminate in dealing
with persons who compete with one another in an adjacent market."2'23 It
noted that imposing on a monopolist a duty "not to be unreasonable or not
to be arbitrary" would be consistent with Supreme Court holdings in "important joint venture cases"2 ' such as Terminal Railroad and Associated
Press.
Finally, the Commission identified "policy reasons" for imposing such
a duty on a monopolist:
Policy reasons for imposing a duty not to be arbitrary are compelling.
Since we are dealing with a monopolist, the victimized customer or
supplier cannot turn to an alternative source. Thus, a refusal by the
monopolist to deal, or deal otherwise than on discriminatory terms,
essentially means the disfavored person suffers a competitive disadvantage which cannot be avoided. Such a result should not come
about from an arbitrary decision by the monopolist. Moreover, arbitrary decisions may affect resource allocation in the adjacent marketthat is, favor one competitor over another for reasons entirely divorced
from considerations of efficiency or willingness of the disfavored
seller to compete effectively . . . . It is inconsistent with the fundamental goals of antitrust to permit such results if they can be avoided
at acceptable cost."'
The Commission turned aside what it characterized as "formidable
policy reasons" which had been advanced in opposition to the existence of
a duty not to be arbitrary.2 6 In the course of doing so, it acknowledged, with
remarkable understatement, that the result it had arrived at "may be inconsistent to some extent with the theory of the Colgate doctrine." 2 7 The
Commission had this to say about Colgate:
In Colgate the court recognized the right of a trader "freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will
deal," at least in the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a
monopoly. Here, there is no such purpose, but we believe the philosophy of Colgate must give way to a limited extent where the business
judgment is exercised by a monopolist in an arbitrary way. 8
Before endeavoring to apply this newly-created duty to the facts
before it, the Commission undertook to define what it meant by the term
21,650 at 21,817.
Id.
225 d. at 21,818.
2-

2"

22e

ld.

M2Id. n. 37.
Published
no id.by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1981

29

Akron Law Review, Vol. 14 [1981], Iss. 4, Art. 1
AKRON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14:4

"arbitrary." It disclaimed any intention to impose a duty on a monopolist
to deal fairly and equally in every case:
Rather, we should limit ourselves to a concern with conduct which
results in a substantial injury to competition and lacks substantial business justification. In examining the question of business justifications,
the economic self interest of the monopolist would be the major but
not the exclusive consideration. Where there is little justification for a
business policy, the antitrust laws can require that the monopolist
take into account the effect on competition of its actions in the line
up of its customers, suppliers or others wishing to
of commerce22 made
9
deal with it.
Application of the duty not to be arbitrary to the facts before it
detained the Commission only briefly. It ruled that Donnelley's failure to
list connecting flight information for commuter carriers was arbitrary and,
therefore, a violation of section 5.23 ° It was "arbitrary" because, according to
internal company documents, it could have been carried out at a cost of
only $6,000 in 1972, and it was in fact carried out in December 1976,
without any adverse consequences for Donnelley.2 3 1 The Commission therefore concluded that "Donnelley's failure to list commuter connecting flights
was arbitrary, caused commuter air carriers significant competitive injury,
and constituted a violation of § 5.''23The Commission also decided, however, that Donnelley's failure to
merge the listings of noncertificated carriers with those of certificated carriers was not arbitrary. 33 It reasoned that Donnelley had "a substantial
business justification for its separate listing policy." 2 4 The policy was based
on "Donnelley's belief that certificated carriers provide more reliable flight
information for listing in the OAG and are generally faster, safer, and more
comfortable than commuter carriers." 3 5 Comparable 236justifications existed
for listing the intrastate carriers in a separate category.
The Commission's holding in Donnelley constitutes a sharp break
with section 2 precedents, and the authorities relied upon by the Commission to impose on a monopolist a duty not to be arbitrary in fact offer
no support for the holding.
First, the Commission's reliance upon LaPeyre as principal authority
for the proposition that a monopolist has an obligation not to injure cus229
2 0
3

Id. at 21,819.
Id. at 21,820.

231 Id.
2 82

/d. (footnote omitted).
23 Id.
'2Id.
235 Id.
$s 14?
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tomers is misplaced. Despite Commissioner Elman's reference in his concurring opinion to public utility principles, the facts of LaPeyre place it
squarely within the reasoning of the Supreme Court's ruling in Otter Tail.
Both the Commission's opinion and Commissioner Elman's concurring
opinion turn on the central fact that LePeyre was using its monopoly
power in the market for the manufacture of shrimp peeling equipment to
gain a competitive advantage in another market in which it was indirectly
engaged, through Grand Caillou: the shrimp canning business.
Commissioner Elman concurred in LaPeyre to emphasize that the
case was not properly subject to analysis under Robinson-Patman price
discrimination principles, principles upon which he believed the majority
had implicitly relied. The majority characterized the violation of section
5 as follows:
The gravamen of the offense so found is the fixing and charging of
higher discriminatory peeling machinery rental rates to producers of
canned shrimp located in the Northwestern United States with the
result and effect of injuring and destroying competition between said
Northwest canners and canners located in the Gulf and South Atlantic
23 7
areas of the United States.
Commissioner Elman emphasized that the discriminatory rental rate
was not simply the result of unfair price discrimination by Peelers but was
rather the result of the exercise of monopoly power by Peelers in the equipment market to achieve benefits which could not otherwise be secured
in an adjacent market, the market for canning shrimp." 8
This cross-market exercise of monopoly power is indistinguishable
from the conduct reviewed by the Supreme Court in Otter Tail and by the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Berkey."3 9 If the Commission in Donnelley had not chosen to wrench Commissioner Elman's observations from
their particular factual context, LaPeyre would have been unavailable as
authority.
The "joint venture" authorities relied upon by the Commission are
inapposite, since they address joint conduct by competitors to bar access
by other competitors to a vital facility or resource. While the Commission
acknowledged that this feature made the two cases relied upon, Terminal
Railroad and Associated Press, "different from the case at hand,"2 0 it believed that the decisions nonetheless evidence "the Court's . . . concern
that 'scarce resources' be made available, on a non-discriminatory basis." ' '
237 65 FTC at 848.
238 See text accompanying note 216 supra.
239

See notes 86-88 supra and accompanying text.

21,650 at 21,818.
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The Commission reasoned that it is only a "small step" from this "concern"
to the holding in the Donnelley case, imposing "a duty not to be arbitrary
on a monopolist who controls a scarce resource which cannot be duplicated
by the joint efforts of companies seeking to use it. 24 2
By taking the "small step" it did, the Commission converted permissible
conduct into illegal conduct. The Commission should have paid more attention to the text of section 5 under which it was proceeding. Section 5 (a)
prohibits "unfair methods of competition. ' 24 Donnelley's conduct was,
simply stated, not a "method of competition." There was no finding by
the Commission that Donnelley had acquired a monopoly of the relevant
market by unfair means or that it had maintained that monopoly by the
proper use of monopoly power. Similarly, there was no finding that Donnelley's refusal to list commuter connecting flights or its refusal to merge
the listing of all three classes of carriers were acts of competition. Rather,
they were acts by a lawful monopolist, who had no competition, undertaken
pursuant to judgments made by the monopolist about how to go about
its business. While it is true those judgments had an adverse competitive
impact on certain classes of "customers" of the monopolist, they were not
made in furtherance of any "method of competition." Donnelley was not
engaged in competition. It had no competition.
Rather, what the Commission did, without acknowledging it, was to
convert Donnelley into a public utility and impose liability regardless of
fault. Without warrant in the text of section 5 or from any other source
of antitrust doctrine, the Commission created a standard of absolute liability for any possessor of monopoly power whose conduct, unrelated to the
exercise of that power, has an adverse impact on firms outside the market
occupied by the monopolist. This is diametrically opposed both to Colgate
and to the test of liability so carefully delineated by the Second Circuit
in Berkey.
The Second Circuit recognized as much when it reversed the Commission's ruling. The court methodically rejected each link in the Commission's chain of reasoning. First, it explained that Lorain Journal"' and
Otter Tail did not support the imposition of a duty to deal, because the
conduct there under review was efforts by monopolists to preserve or extend
their monopoly." '
Next, the court found inapposite the "joint conduct" cases relied upon
by the Commission-Associated Press and Terminal Railroad. It pointed
2

421d.

248 Emphasis added. See note 194 supra for the text of section 5(a).
244 342 U.S. 143 (1951).

63,544 at 76,918 (2d Cir. 1980).
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol14/iss4/1
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out that there the illegality of defendant's conduct inhered in efforts to
block competitors' access to essential facilities or services." '
The court then distinguished LaPeyre by observing that "the utilization of monopoly power in one market in LaPeyre resulted in discrimination
and the curtailment of competition in another market in which the monopolist himself was also engaged ... ."I" Donnelley's conduct, in contrast,
secured it no competitive advantages or benefits in any market.
After observing that recognition of a duty to deal "would give the
FTC too much power to substitute its own business judgment for that of
the monopolist in any decision that arguably affects competition in another industry,"" ' the court of appeals suggested that the Colgate doctrine
is not "as dead as the Commission would have it." ' The right to select
one's customers remains a central principle of antitrust law:
We think that even a monopolist, as long as he has no purpose to
restrain competition or to enhance or expand his monopoly, and does
not act coercively retains this right."'
A review of recent decisions finding no illegality in refusals to deal
with noncompetitors underscores the error of the Commission's ruling in
Donnelley. It was alleged in Almeda Mall, Inc. v. Houston Lighting &
Power Co. (Almeda Mall),251 that the electric utility serving the Houston
area, Houston Lighting & Power Company (Houston Lighting), violated
section 2 when it refused to sell electricity to any of three regional shopping
malls, Almeda Mall, Northwest Mall and Westwood Mall, through a single
meter at each mall. Each mall proposed to buy the electricity it needed
for the entire mall through a single meter and thereby gain the advantage
of the cheapest rate charged by Houston Lighting, the LGS rate. 52 The malls
then proposed to resell the electricity to the individual retail tenants at a
higher rate, the MGS rate, which Houston Lighting would charge the tenants if it were dealing directly with them. 53 The mall owners would thereby
realize a profit on the resale of electricity.
Houston Lighting refused to sell electricity at the LGS rate to the
malls through a single meter, and the malls thereupon brought separate
actions against it alleging violations of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Act. The actions were consolidated for trial.25" The malls alleged that this
2e Id.
2 47

Id. at 76,919.
248 Id.
2 49

Id. at 76,920.

250 Id.

615 F.2d 343 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 209 (1980).
Id. at 348.
253 Id.
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refusal "denied them the right to compete with [Houston Lighting] in
the retail sale of electricity to their tenants" and that the refusal "[had]
injured competition between them and other regional shopping centers
'
The trial court directed a verdict in favor of dein the Houston area."255
fendant, and the court of appeals affirmed.25
After reciting the two elements of proof of unlawful monopolization
established by the Supreme Court in Grinnell,5 ' the court distinguished Otter Tail, the malls' principal authority. The court noted that the municipal
power systems to whom Otter Tail Power had refused to sell electricity for resale were "independent distribution systems capable of competing with the
Otter Tail utility." 58 The court noted:
[C]ompetition clearly existed for the total retail market of entire
municipalities, which could opt for service from Otter Tail or from
the municipal system. The refusal by Otter Tail to sell electric power at
wholesale or to transfer power, therefore, removed the option of
choosing the desired power system. " "
The court explained, however, that there was no such option in the
Houston electric power market, "because HL&P [Houston Lighting] is the
2
only electric utility supplying power to the Houston area." ' The court
explained, further, that Houston Lighting, unlike Otter Tail Power, had
not refused to sell power at wholesale to a competing distribution system
and had not refused to transfer or supply power to a competing distribution
system requesting it." 1 The court observed:
[a] refusal to sell power at wholesale so as to prevent another system
from selling at a different, competitive retail rate is one thing; selling
power at retail and refusing to allow the purchaser to resell at the
same retail price is a different matter. In the latter situation there is no
competition."'2
The court reasoned that under these circumstances the malls did not
seek actually to compete with Houston Lighting but rather sought to step
into Houston Lighting's electricity distribution system and, by buying
electricity cheap and reselling it at the same retail rate that Houston would
resell it to mall tenants, take profit to which Houston Lighting would
otherwise be entitled. Further, whether the electricity came directly to the
retail tenants from Houston Lighting or from the mall owners, the price to
255 Id.

256 Id.at 345.

237 Id.at 351.
258Id. at 352.
259 Id.
2O

id.

d.at 353.
62
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the retail tenants would be the same. 2 3 The court reasoned that these facts
established no antitrust violation. 6" The mall owners were not true competitors of the utility. They were not competing with the utility for customers by offering the customers reduced rates or any other benefits.
The court also noted that the mall owners had failed to establish
antitrust injury. Citing Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat,8 5 the court
made the following observation:
A showing of lost profits to the appellants is insufficient by itself to
establish a compensable injury under the antitrust laws since there is
no parallel injury to competition. The antitrust laws were not intended to prevent the type of activity undertaken by HL&P in the
present case concerning resale of electric power. The antitrust
laws were designed to protect competition and not necessarily competitors.'"
The court of appeals found it unnecessary to determine whether or not
the utility's conduct would violate the monopolization provision of section
2. It was dispositive that the utility was not refusing to sell electricity at
wholesale to actual or potential competitors. Instead, it was engaged in
a refusal to deal which had no impact on competition in the resale of electricity.
Although the facts in Almeda Mall are distinguishable from those in
Donnelley, because the refusal to deal in Almeda Mall caused the plaintiffs
no significant competitive injury, the Fifth Circuit nonetheless resisted the
temptation, to which the Commission succumbed, to imply a remedy under
the antitrust laws simply because market conduct by a monopolist caused
loss of profits or other economic injury in an adjacent market.
The Second Circuit addressed a single-firm refusal to deal with a
supplier, rather than a customer, in InternationalRailways of Central A merica v. United Brands Co.2"' It was there alleged by the only railroad of any
significance in Guatemala, International Railways of Central America
(IRCA), that the sale by United Fruit Company, the predecessor in interest of the plaintiff, of its banana-producing plantations in western Guatemala (in the Tiquisate area) in such a way as to preclude use of the plantations by other banana producers was an act of unlawful monopolization by
United Fruit, causing IRCA a loss of profits incident to termination of
banana shipments from that area."'
23 Id.
264 Id. at 353-54.
26s 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
284 615 F.2d at 354 (emphasis in original).
247 532 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U..
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In the 1950's and early in the 1960's, United Fruit and Standard Fruit
were the only two significant producers of bananas in Guatemala."' All
of United Fruit's banana-producing land was in the Tiquisate territory
in western Guatemala. 7 ' IRCA, as the only major railroad in Guatemala,
transported all banana production from Tisquisate to Port Barrios, where
the fruit was prepared for export." 1
In 1961, United Fruit began a company-wide program to sell or otherwise dispose of many of its unproductive land holdings, including the
Tiquisate properties. "2 ' Although the plaintiff disputed defendant's contention that it disposed of the Tiquisate properties in good faith, the district
court found that the properties had indeed been sold for legitimate business
reasons, and this finding was not disturbed on appeal."' 3 IRCA attempted
to demonstrate, among other things, that in disposing of Tiquisate, United
Fruit "did so in such a way as to forestall its competition from moving
in."274 By the time the properties were closed down and sold in August
1964, however, Standard Fruit, the only other significant banana producer
in Guatemala, had already closed its Guatemalan operations. Indeed,
Standard Fruit's decision to cease Guatemalan operations was made even
before United Fruit decided in September 1962 to phase out the Tiquisate
properties." 5
Relying upon Lorain Journal, Eastman Kodak and Alcoa, IRCA contended that even if United Fruit had legitimate business reasons to abandon
the Tiquisate properties, the closing nonetheless violated section 2:
The violation of Section 2 is premised on the theory that UF [United
2 70
Fruit] abused its monopoly power by refusing to deal with IRCA.
The court of appeals disagreed with this theory of liability. It observed
that it is not the law that "any act of the alleged monopolist irrespective
of intent constitutes a Section 2 violation."27 The court went on:
The action alleged to offend Section 2 must be one which is monopolistic. The Supreme Court has clearly indicated that in order to
establish such a section 2 violation, the plaintiff must establish that
the defendant had deliberate or willful purpose to exercise monopoly
power [citing Grinnell and American Tobacco] . . . . Monopoly power is well understood as the 'power to control prices or exclude competition.'2 "
2159d. at 238.
70
2 1d. at 235.
271 Id. at 236-37.
2721d. at 237.
273 Id. at 238, 241-43.
274 d. at 238.
2751t d.

Id. at 239.
277 Id.
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The court reasoned that the closing of the Tiquisate properties was not an
exercise of monopoly power:
UF in fact had no reasonable business alternative but to abandon
an unprofitable and uncomfortable operation. This cannot possibly be
characterized as an act of monopolization, which is the exercise of a
power to fix prices or to exclude competition. Appellant's proposition
boils down to the argument that a defendant which has a monopolistic
position can never abandon an unprofitable operation but must continue to lost money because shutting down might involve a loss of
profit for the supplier of a service. No authority for this position has
been advanced or discovered.t 9
The court, which had assumed for purposes of argument that United
Fruit in fact possessed monopoly power in the relevant market, the importation of bananas into the United States from Guatemala,2 * properly
concluded that United Fruit's conduct did not violate section 2. The action
taken by United Fruit was not made possible by its possession of monopoly
power, the predicate for proof of unlawful monopolization. Rather, the
action was conduct which United Fruit, with or without monopoly power,
would have been forced to undertake for perfectly sound business reasons.
The fact that IRCA suffered a loss of profits or was otherwise damaged
as a result did not convert the conduct into a violation of section 2. United
Fruit's conduct was not in furtherance of maintenance of a monopoly and
produced no injurious effects on its competitors,"' and even though IRCA
sustained injury as a result of the conduct, the injury was not antitrust injury-injury flowing from actions unlawful under the antitrust laws. 82
It is well established that a firm may not exercise monopoly power
in one market to create or attempt to create a monopoly in another market. 83 Similarly, a single firm violates section 2 by using monopoly power
in one market to gain a competitive advantage in another, even if the effort
falls short of attempted monopolization. 8" As the Second Circuit noted
in reversing Donnelley, it does no necessarily follow, however, that a refusal by a monopolist to deal with a firm in an adjacent market violates
section 2. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reached the same conclusion in Fulton v. Hecht, 8 ' already discussed briefly above."
It was alleged in Fulton v. Hecht that a refusal to deal by a dog-racing
2791d. at 239-40.

280

Id. at 240, and n. 18.
261 See notes 245-47 supra and accompanying text.
28 2
See notes 265-66 supra and accompanying text.
283 See, e.g., United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107-09 (1948).
2 84
See, e.g., Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 275 (2d Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980); Greyhound Computer Corp. v. International Business
Machines Corp., 559 F.2d 488, 503 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1040 (1978).
283 580 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 981 (1979).
280 See notes 219-22 supra and accompanying text.
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track operator with a trainer who had previously run his dogs at the track
did not violate section 2 even though it had an anticompetitive impact
on the market in which the trainer was engaged, dog-racing. The plaintiff,
Fulton, raised and raced greyhounds. 8 ' He had for some 15 years raced
his dogs at four tracks in south Florida. 8 One of the owners of one of
the tracks, Hecht, refused after the 1972 summer season to renew Fulton's
contract to race at the West Flagler Kennel Club, the track operated by
Hecht."2 ' Because at any given time only two of the four tracks would be
in operation, and only one of those two would be in Dade County (where
three of the four tracks were located), Fulton argued that Hecht possessed
monopoly power in the relevant market, the south Florida greyhound racing
market.'"
Without deciding whether or not Hecht, as operator of the Flagler
track, had monopoly power, the court noted that plaintiff had failed to
present any evidence that Hecht used his power to enhance or maintain
his position." 1 Citing Colgate, the court noted that there was no evidence
that Hecht's refusal to deal was in furtherance of monopolization.8 2
The court then addressed Fulton's alternative argument, "that a monopolist has a duty to deal fairly with anyone who seeks to compete in an
adjacent market."" 3 Fulton apparently reasoned that even if the refusal
to deal by Hecht was permissible under Colgate, it was nonetheless violative
of section 2 because it had an anticompetitive impact on the market in which
Fulton was engaged, the racing of greyhounds. (The market in which defendant Hecht was engaged was apparently the operation of tracks at which
greyhounds raced). The court of appeals turned aside this argument by
noting that all of the authorities relied upon by Fulton rested upon refusals to deal in which the plaintiff had been victimized by his direct competitors. " The court distinguished Deesen v. Professional Golfer Association," one of Fulton's principal authorities:
[W]e think that the court's holding and the fact that it considered the
reasonableness of the regulations under the section 2 monopoly claim
must be limited to the circumstances of that case. The key element,
we think, is that the PGA was an association made up of professional

287 580 F.2d at 1245.

Id.
Id. at 1246.
290 Id.
288
289

29 11d. at 1247.

Id.
293 Id.
202

(footnote omitted).

2a41d. at 1247-48.
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golfers, i.e., direct competitors in the market of participating as golfers
in professional golf tournaments. 9 '
While acknowledging that a monopolist's refusal to deal might have
"anticompetitive or other undesirable economic effects" in an adjacent market, the court declined to extend section 2 as far as plaintiff requested. It
reasoned as follows:
While it appears that a monopolist could have an anticompetitive purpose only with respect to its competitors or potential competitors, the
anticompetitive effects of a monopolist's behavior might occur only
in an adjacent market. If such effects, standing by themselves were
sufficient to constitute a violation of § 2, the right of a single firm to
refuse to deal with another, recognized in Colgate, supra, would be
significantly reduced. Not only would a firm's unilateral refusal to deal
violate § 2 if it was done to enhance or maintain the monopoly,
such a refusal would also violate § 2 if it had an inevitable anticompetitive effect in an adjacent market. This limitation on the Colgate
doctrine is justifiable if the monopoly is really just an association of
competitors in the market where the anticompetitive effects are felt.
See United States v. Terminal Railroad Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 . . .
(1912). However, we think any broader reading of § 2, with the
accompanying private cause of action under § 4 of the Clayton Act,
15 U.S.C. § 15, would be unwise.""
The court's position is, of course, exactly the opposite of that taken
by the Federal Trade Commission in Donnelley. In order to fashion its
new test for permissible single-firm behavior in Donnelley, the Commission
necessarily had to ignore the court's reasoning in Fulton. As already noted,
however, it took solace in the court of appeals' recognition, in dictum, that
"under § 5 of the FTC Act, a monopolist may be required to use uniform
and reasonable criteria when dealing with those who compete in an adjacent
market,"2Ds citing LaPeyre v. FTC.299 Of course, this speculation about the
reach of the FTC Act has since been put to rest by the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit in its reversal of the Commission's ruling in Don30
nelley. 0
There is pending before the Federal Trade Commission another proceeding raising questions about the legality of a refusal to deal by a singlefirm monopolist with potential customers. The Commission has charged
General Motors Corporation (GM)3 °1 with violating section 5 of the FTC
296 580 F.2d at 1248 (footnote omitted).
97
2
Id. at 1249 n.2.
29s ld. But see 2 ARBEDA & TuRNEa, supra

note 12,
307a-307f (analysis and results should
be the same in an equitable proceeding under either section 5 of FTC Act or sections 1 or 2
of Sherman Act).
:99 366 F.2d 117 (5th Cir. 1966).
00
oSee notes 244-250 supra and accompanying text.
301 In re General Motors Corp. No. 9077 (Sept. 24, 1979).
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Act by, among other things, refusing to sell crash parts to any persons
other than franchised dealers."s In an opinion filed September 24, 1979,
an administrative law judge (ALJ) ruled that GM's refusal to deal did
not violate the antitrust laws.
Complaint counsel defined crash parts as fenders, grills, bumpers and
all other replacement parts for the bodies of GM-manufactured cars and
trucks. 3 Crash parts are distributed by GM exclusively to its dealers, who
"
either wholesale, otherwise resell or install the parts.' GM is the only
source for the parts, which are manufactured either by GM itself or by
0°
independent manufacturers on tooling owned by GM.
ALJ first addressed complaint counsel's contention that United
Arnold, Schwinn & Co."' requires a manufacturer to deal with
when there are no competitive alternatives to the manufacturer's
Complaint counsel relied upon the following language in Schwinn:
[A] manufacturer of a product other and equivalent brands of
which are readily available in the market may select his customers,
and for this purpose he may "franchise" certain dealers to whom
alone, he will sell his goods ....If the restraint stops at that pointif nothing more is involved than vertical "confinement" of the manufacturer's own sales of the merchandise to selected dealers, and if
competitive products are readily available to others, the restriction,
0
on these facts alone would not violate the Sherman Act." '

The
States v.
everyone
products.

°8
The ALJ declined to rely upon this dictum in Schwinn and instead
noted that analysis of the legality of GM's refusal to deal with anyone
except its franchised dealers "starts from the premise that, absent a purpose
to monopolize or an effect producing an unreasonable restraint on trade,
0 9
GM may choose its system of distribution." Quoting from Schwing Motor
Co. v. Hudson Sales Corp. 1 ' and citing Colgate, the ALJ acknowledged
that a manufacturer has a natural monopoly over its own products but
11
that it can refuse to deal for reasons sufficient to itself. The ALJ then
employed a two-step analysis of the legality of GM's conduct. First, it
noted that GM's reasons for dealing only with its franchised dealers were
justifiable. It found no "predatory motives" on the part of GM and found

In re General Motors Corp., No. 9077, slip op. at 2 (Sept. 24, 1979).
303 Id.at 18.
o Id.
805 Id.at 18-19.
0 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
SOTId. at 376.
908 No. 9077, slip op. at 71.

302

809 id.

810 138 F. Supp. 899, 902 (D. Md. 1956), affd per curian, 239 F.2d 1976 (4th Cir. 1956),

cert. denied, 355 U.S. 823 (1957).

311 No. 9077, slip op. at 72.
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that the distribution arrangement served "legitimate business purposes (such
as a better way to distribute new GM crash parts in order to promote the
sale of new cars, or to stabilize dealer outlets or to augment profits . . .)
. .".1,2
He then inquired whether the effect of the refusal to deal is
"substantially adverse to competition." '
The ALJ reasoned that because GM was not in competition with the
dealers to whom it refused to sell crash parts, there could be no adverse
effect on competition within the contemplation of the antitrust laws. " ' He
summarized his conclusion as follows:
Insofar as the system GM uses for distributing crash parts is concerned,
no persuasive evidence has been introduced of either a predatory intent or substantially adverse effect on competition attributable to the
refusal to sell new GM crash parts to anyone other than GM dealers.
The evidence does indicate that GM uses its system to sell crash
parts exclusively through its dealers because of their mutual interest
in crash parts being readily available . . . and that GM does not
set or monitor prices at which crash parts are sold . . . . a"s
316 on the ground that there was
The AJC then distinguished LaPeyre
present in the shrimp peeling equipment manufacturer's discriminatory
pricing a predatory motive not present on the part of GM.3 1 7
The ALJ's decision is now pending before the full Commission, which
directed the parties on February 6, 1980, to file supplemental briefs in
light of its decision in Donnelley.
m.
CONCLUSION
The legality of a unilateral refusal to deal by a monopolist is governed
by section 2 of the Sherman Act and the standards for evaluating unlawful
monopolization in Berkey and related single-firm monopolization decisions.
If a refusal to deal does not constitute an act of monopolization under these
standards, the Colgate doctrine requires the conclusion that the action is
lawful, even though it may cause competitive or other injury to either the
firm's competitors or members of another market.
The Sixth Circuit in Byars and the Fifth Circuit in Mid-Texas Communications erred in evaluating the legality of refusals to deal by reference
to the test of "reasonableness" applicable to evaluation of restraints of
trade under section 1 of the Sherman Act. This test has no application to
Id. at 73. As detailed in notes 170-91 supra and accompanying text, the legality of a
refusal to deal by a monopolist does not turn upon motive or intent.
$1Id.
314 Id. at 74.
315 Id. at 75 (emphasis in original).
a3165 FTC 794, affd in part sub. nom., LaPeyre v. FTC, 366 F.2d 117 (5th Cir. 1966).
317 No. 9077, slip op. at 75-76.
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unilateral conduct by a monopolist, which is properly evaluated under
monopolization standards alone - was the monopolist's conduct an exertion
of monopoly power rather than conduct which a nonmonopolist would have
found feasible and appropriate?
The Third Circuit erred in Sargent-Welch when it held that the legality
of a unilateral refusal to deal by a monopolist depends upon the purpose
behind the refusal. As Griffith teaches, proof of purpose or specific intent
has no place in a monopolization action.
The Federal Trade Commission erred in Donnelley when it ruled that
a monopolist has a duty to deal fairly with customers. In reversing the
Commission's holding, Second Circuit properly noted the legality of a
unilateral refusal to deal by a monopolist is governed by the Colgate doctrine where the refusal secures no competitive advantages for the monopolist. The Fifth Circuit recognized in Almeda Mall and Fulton v. Hecht that
a refusal to deal producing competitive injury in a market outside that in
which the monopolist is engaged does not ipso facto constitute a violation
of section 2. The Second Circuit recognized the same principle in International Railways, and an administrative law judge of the Federal Trade
Commission has done the same in General Motors Corporation. While
policy reasons may support the Commission's holding in Donnelley, that
holding squarely conflicts with Colgate and cannot stand unless the Supreme
Court is prepared to modify or overrule Colgate.
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